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THE ROLE OF APPROPRIATION IN LOCKE’S 
ACCOUNT OF PERSONS AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
RUTH BOEKER 
 
Abstract 
According to Locke, appropriation is a precondition for moral responsibility and 
thus we can expect that it plays a distinctive role in his theory. Yet it is rare to 
find an interpretation of Locke’s account of appropriation that does not associate 
it with serious problems. To make room for a more satisfying understanding of 
Locke’s account of appropriation we have to analyse why it was so widely 
misunderstood. The aim of this paper is fourfold: First, I will show that Mackie’s 
and Winkler’s interpretations that have shaped the subsequent discussion contain 
serious flaws. Second, I will argue that the so-called appropriation interpretation 
—that is the view that appropriation is meant to provide alternative persistence 
conditions for persons—lacks support. Third, I will re-examine Locke’s texts 
and argue that we can come to a better understanding of his notion of 
appropriation in the Essay if we interpret it in analogy to his account of 
appropriation in Two Treatises. Fourth, I will offer a more fine-grained 
interpretation of the role of appropriation in relation to persistence conditions for 
persons. I conclude by showing that the advantage of this proposal is that it 
reconciles interpretations that have commonly been thought to be inconsistent. 
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§1. Introduction 
Locke’s theory of personal identity aims to answer questions of 
moral accountability. For Locke it is important that a person 
understands why he or she is held accountable for an action and 
this involves that he or she understands the moral laws and 
appropriates the action, or acknowledges it as his or her own. 
This means that, according to Locke, appropriation is a 
precondition for moral accountability and we can therefore expect 
that appropriation plays a distinctive role in Locke’s theory (see 
II.xxvii.16, 26).
1
 
 
1
 All references to John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. 
Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975), will appear by book number, chapter number, and 
section number. For further discussion see Antonia LoLordo, Locke’s Moral Man 
(Oxford, 2012), ch. 2; J. L. Mackie, Problems from Locke (Oxford, 1976), 176–77, 183; 
Galen Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment 
  
 
4 
Despite the significance of appropriation, the reception of it in 
the literature is predominantly dismissive or negative, and it is 
rare to find an interpretation that does not associate appropriation 
with serious problems for Locke’s theory.
2
 In this paper I will 
argue that a satisfying interpretation of Locke’s account of 
appropriation is missing and that the arguments that are meant to 
present problems for Locke’s account of appropriation are 
seriously flawed. By analyzing why Locke’s account of 
appropriation has been so widely misunderstood, I want to urge 
all those interpreters who tend to assume that Locke’s notion of 
appropriation is well explored and understood in the literature to 
re-examine Locke’s actual views.
3
   
In the literature J. L. Mackie and Kenneth Winkler are often 
given credit for drawing attention to appropriation.
4
 However, 
Mackie associates appropriation with ‘perhaps the most damaging 
objection’
5
 against Locke’s theory of personal identity, and 
Winkler ends his interpretation by acknowledging a tension 
between Locke’s account of appropriation and divine 
 
(Princeton, NJ, 2011), ch. 3, especially 17–18; Kenneth P. Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal 
Identity’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1991): 223; Gideon Yaffe, ‘Locke 
on Ideas of Identity and Diversity’, in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay 
concerning Human Understanding”, ed. Lex Newman (Cambridge, 2007), 220–23. 
2
 See Mackie, Problems from Locke, 183; Shelley Weinberg, ‘Locke on Personal 
Identity’, Philosophy Compass 6 (2011): 401–2 and ‘The Metaphysical Fact of 
Consciousness in Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity’, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 50 (2012): 388–90; Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity’; Yaffe, ‘Locke 
on Ideas of Identity and Diversity’, 221–23. LoLordo, Locke’s Moral Man, ch. 2, does 
not follow the negative trend and endorses an appropriation interpretation. Other 
interpreters, who acknowledge appropriation in Locke’s theory, but who are less often 
cited, include Michael Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology (2 vols., London, 
1991), ii, 266–68; David P. Behan, ‘Locke on Persons and Personal Identity’, Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 9 (1979): 53–75; Eric Matthews, ‘Descartes and Locke on the 
Concept of a Person’, The Locke Newsletter 8 (1977): 26–28, 32–33; Strawson, Locke 
on Personal Identity, 17–18; Udo Thiel, Lockes Theorie der personalen Identität 
(Bonn, 1983), 116–17. 
3
 For example, LoLordo, Locke’s Moral Man, maintains that ‘[t]he appropriation 
interpretation is relatively familiar’ (66). 
4
 See Mackie, Problems from Locke, 183; Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity’. 
5
 Mackie, Problems from Locke, 183.  
  
 
5 
rectification. In the recent literature there has been a revival of 
this discussion, and Gideon Yaffe, Shelley Weinberg, and 
Antonia LoLordo have coined the term ‘appropriation 
interpretation.’
6
 While they all ascribe this interpretation to 
Winkler—and in some degree to Mackie—they tend to assume 
that appropriation is meant to provide alternative persistence 
conditions for persons that avoid problems that arise for memory 
interpretations, namely, the view that (direct or indirect) memory 
relations are necessary and sufficient for personal identity.
7
 This 
means the appropriation interpretation is the view that the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of what makes a person the 
same over time are to be understood in terms of appropriation. It 
is not obvious that Winkler’s original interpretation actually 
supports this view and thus I will use the term ‘appropriation 
interpretation’ to refer to the view that appropriation is meant to 
 
6
 See LoLordo, ‘Author Meets Critics on Antonia LoLordo’s “Locke’s Moral Man”: 
LoLordo’s Reply to Weinberg’, The Mod Squad: A Group Blog in Modern Philosophy, 
June 25, 2014, http://philosophymodsquad.wordpress.com/2013/07/07/amc-lmm-
lolordos-reply-to-weinberg/, Locke’s Moral Man, ch. 2, especially 65–66, 70–74, 82 (n 
30), 98–99, 102; Shelley Weinberg, ‘Author Meets Critics on Antonia LoLordo’s 
“Locke’s Moral Man”: Shelley Weinberg’, The Mod Squad, June 25, 2014,  
http://philosophymodsquad.wordpress.com/2013/07/06/amc-lmm-shelley-weinberg/ 
‘Locke on Personal Identity’, 401–2, ‘The Metaphysical Fact’, 388–90; Yaffe, ‘Locke 
on Ideas of Identity and Diversity’, 221–23. 
7
 Yaffe argues that, according to Locke, personal identity consists in sameness of 
consciousness and so the real question is what Locke means by sameness of 
consciousness. Yaffe discusses different meanings of sameness of consciousness. After 
he has outlined the problems for the view that consciousness is to be understood in 
terms of memory, he turns to the proposal that ‘“consciousness” is to be understood as 
“appropriation” or “subjective constitution”’ (‘Locke on Ideas of Identity and 
Diversity’, 221). This set-up makes clear that he assumes appropriation is meant to 
provide alternative persistence conditions for persons. Similarly Weinberg considers 
problems concerning the memory and appropriation interpretations to motivate her own 
interpretation of Locke’s persistence conditions for persons. See ‘Locke on Personal 
Identity’, 401–2, ‘The Metaphysical Fact’, 388–90. LoLordo asks how consciousness 
extends itself backwards. She rejects the view that consciousness extends itself by 
memory in favour of her view that it extends itself by appropriation (see Locke’s Moral 
Man, 65, 70, 73). LoLordo argues ‘that consciousnesses extend themselves into the past 
and future by appropriation’ (Locke’s Moral Man, 65). The phrase ‘consciousness 
extends itself by appropriation’ is vague, but because LoLordo contrasts her view with 
the memory interpretation she seems to treat appropriation as analogous to memory 
relations. 
  
 
6 
provide persistence conditions for persons, but, contrary to Yaffe, 
Weinberg, and LoLordo, I will examine whether, rather than 
assume that, Winkler endorses it. Moreover, it is not obvious that 
Locke would endorse it either. If this was his view, why did he 
not simply say that personal identity consists in appropriation, 
rather than claiming that it consists in sameness of 
consciousness? Yaffe and Weinberg acknowledge the 
appropriation interpretation as an important interpretation, but 
argue that their own respective interpretations of the persistence 
conditions for persons are to be preferred and not subject to the 
problems associated with the appropriation interpretation. All 
those who follow the trend and associate persistence conditions in 
terms of appropriation with serious problems tend to dismiss the 
possibility that appropriation can play a different role in Locke’s 
theory.
8
 In contrast to Yaffe and Weinberg, LoLordo endorses the 
appropriation interpretation.  
The aim of this paper is fourfold: First, I will carefully 
examine Mackie’s and Winkler’s influential interpretations and 
show that their arguments, which are meant to present problems 
for Locke’s account of appropriation, are seriously flawed. 
Second, I will argue that the so-called appropriation interpretation 
lacks support, because it cannot be ascribed to Mackie and 
Winkler as is assumed by Yaffe, Weinberg, and LoLordo and that 
the problems that Yaffe and Weinberg associate with it dissolve 
under closer scrutiny. Third, I will re-examine Locke’s texts and 
argue that we can come to a better understanding of his account 
of appropriation in the Essay if we interpret it in analogy to his 
account of appropriation in Two Treatises. Fourth, I will offer a 
more fine-grained interpretation of the role of appropriation in 
relation to persistence conditions for persons. I will propose that 
we can make progress by considering separately the relations and 
the relata that compose persistence conditions. Given this 
distinction, I argue that it is plausible that the relevant relata are 
 
8
 I admit that it is not the central task of Yaffe’s and Weinberg’s papers to offer a 
theory of appropriation, but the predominantly negative treatment of appropriation in 
the literature may explain why so few interpreters offer positive interpretations of it.  
  
 
7 
appropriated actions or thoughts,
9
 but that it is hard to make sense 
of the view that appropriation provides alternative relations that 
constitute the persistence conditions. These distinctions enable 
me to show that it is misleading to present the appropriation 
interpretation as an alternative to the memory interpretation, but 
rather, if we accept my proposed distinctions, appropriation can 
be reconciled with psychological interpretations as well as with 
interpretations such as Weinberg’s that argue for a more robust 
metaphysical fact of consciousness.
10
 The advantage of my 
proposal is that it does not dismiss appropriation as the critics of 
the appropriation interpretation do, but instead acknowledges that 
appropriation plays a distinctive role in Locke’s theory and takes 
seriously the questions of moral accountability that are at the 
heart of Locke’s theory.
11
 
 
§2. Mackie on Appropriation 
Let us turn to J. L. Mackie’s influential discussion in Problems 
from Locke. He emphasizes that Locke’s theory is a theory of 
action appropriation, but regards this to be an objection against 
Locke’s theory: 
 
[P]erhaps the most damaging objection is this. Since a man at t2 commonly 
remembers only some of his experiences and actions at t1, whereas what 
constituted a person at t1 was all the experiences and actions that were then 
co-conscious, Locke’s view fails to equate a person identified at t2 with any 
person identifiable at t1. It is only a theory of how some items which 
belonged to a person identifiable at t1 are appropriated by a person who can 
 
9
 It is worth noting that Locke’s term ‘thought’ is broader than it is in present-day 
usage and includes any conscious mental state. He adopts this broad notion from his 
predecessors Descartes and Cudworth. See Keith Allen, ‘Cudworth on Mind, Body, and 
Plastic Nature’, Philosophy Compass 8 (2013): 337–47, 343.   
10
 See Weinberg, ‘The Metaphysical Fact’. 
11
 For further discussion see Ruth Boeker, ‘The Moral Dimension in Locke’s 
Account of Persons and Personal Identity’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (2014): 
229–47;  Edmund Law, ‘A Defence of Mr. Locke’s Opinion Concerning Personal 
Identity’, in vol. 2 of The Works of John Locke, 12th ed. (London, 1824); Jessica 
Spector, ‘The Grounds of Moral Agency: Locke’s Account of Personal Identity’, 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (2008): 256–81. 
  
 
8 
be identified as such only at t2. It is therefore hardly a theory of personal 
identity at all, but might be better described as a theory of action 
appropriation. Locke seems to be forgetting that ‘person’ is not only ‘a 
forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit’, but also the noun 
corresponding to all the personal pronouns. (Problems from Locke, 183) 
 
Mackie distinguishes a theory of personal identity from a 
theory of action appropriation. In order to explain his argument, it 
is worth specifying what he means by each of them respectively. 
A theory of personal identity offers necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a person P1 existing at t1 to be the same person as a 
person P2 existing at t2. The important point for Mackie’s 
argument is that a theory of personal identity concerns individuals 
existing at different times. In contrast to this, according to 
Mackie, a theory of action appropriation offers an account of the 
actions that a being
12
 ascribes, or appropriates, to him- or herself 
at a particular time.
13
  
On this basis, we can analyze Mackie’s argument for the claim 
that a theory of action appropriation does not qualify as a theory 
of personal identity. His argument has the following structure: 
 
(1) A person at a time t is constituted by all the experiences and actions 
of which he or she is co-conscious at t. 
(2) A person P2 at t2 appropriates only some experiences and actions of 
a person P1 existing at an earlier time t1.  
(3) In order for action appropriation to provide a suitable account of 
personal identity, P2 has to appropriate all of P1’s experiences and actions. 
(4) Action appropriation does not provide a suitable account of the 
identity of P1 with P2.  
 
 
12
 I use the term ‘being’ to be neutral with respect to the question whether a person 
exists prior to the act of action appropriation or whether action appropriation is a 
constitutive element of a person’s existence. 
13
 The textual evidence is not decisive whether Locke intends to offer a theory of 
action appropriation or a theory of personal identity over time. Support for the former 
can be found in II.xxvii.16 and 26. However, other passages such as II.xxvii.25 suggest 
that, according to Locke, a person exists over time.  
  
 
9 
The textual support makes it plausible to assume (1), and (2) is 
confirmed by experience. However, the question arises as to why 
Mackie endorses (3) and whether (3) should be accepted.  
First, it is worth noting that (3) assumes that action 
appropriation is intended to provide persistence conditions for 
persons without providing any argument for this assumption. 
Second, Mackie equates the appropriation of a past action with 
remembering the past action as one’s own. There are three 
different ways to interpret what is meant by appropriation of past 
actions by remembrance.
14
 First, to appropriate a past action 
could be understood simply as remembering that action. This 
reading reduces appropriation of past actions to memory. 
However, if this was correct, then appropriation would not play 
any distinctive role in Locke’s theory and Mackie’s interpretation 
would be a version of a psychological account of personal 
identity.
15
 
Second, appropriation of past actions by remembrance could 
be a special kind of remembering that differs intrinsically from 
other kinds of memory. However, it is unlikely that Mackie 
understands appropriation in this sense, because it undermines his 
argument. Mackie assumes that in order for action appropriation 
to provide persistence conditions for persons, P2 has to 
appropriate all the experiences and actions that P1 was co-
conscious at t1 and not merely those that one remembers in a 
special way. 
On a third reading, appropriation of past actions could be 
distinguished from remembrance simpliciter, by proposing that 
appropriation does not only involve remembrance, but 
additionally a further component that cannot be reduced to 
 
14
 Note that I here focus on the appropriation of past actions, since they are the 
focus of Mackie’s argument. It is plausible that not only past actions are appropriated, 
but also present actions and the appropriation of present actions will involve 
consciousness, rather than memory. The considerations given here can be extended to 
the appropriation of present actions by replacing ‘memory’ with ‘consciousness’. 
15
 I use the term ‘psychological account of personal identity’ to refer to any theory 
that accounts for the persistence conditions for persons in terms of psychological 
relations such as consciousness or memory. 
  
 
10 
memory. For instance, it can be suggested that appropriation of 
past actions, does not merely require that I remember the action, 
but, additionally, I must have performed the action. This proposal 
provides a means to distinguish my actions from the actions of 
others that I can remember or be aware of. While I can remember 
the actions that my sister did, I do not appropriate them. In other 
words, I only appropriate actions that I performed myself. Again, 
it is unlikely that Mackie considered this meaning, because it 
renders his argument inconsistent. Given his assumption that in 
order for action appropriation to provide persistence conditions 
for persons, P2 has to appropriate all the experiences and actions 
that P1 was co-conscious at t1, Mackie seems committed to the 
view that P1 appropriates the actions that he or she perceived 
others doing at that time—yet this is exactly what this reading 
rejects. Consequently, each reading undermines the force of 
Mackie’s argument. 
A further deficiency of Mackie’s argument is that he fails to 
properly motivate the strong and questionable assumption that all 
past experiences and actions have to be appropriated in order for 
action appropriation to provide a suitable account of personal 
identity. This is a pressing question, because there are alternative, 
and at least equally plausible, accounts of the persistence 
conditions for persons. For example, one might argue instead—
inspired by certain Neo-Lockean views—that a sufficient number 
of past experiences and actions have to be appropriated.
16
 Mackie 
may respond that such a proposal is a revision of Locke’s view 
and does not properly accommodate Locke’s aim to answer 
questions of moral accountability with his theory. At this stage, it 
is worth drawing attention to the fact that I am conscious of more 
 
16
 For instance, according to Derek Parfit, ‘[f]or X and Y to be the same person, 
there must be over every day enough direct psychological connections’ (Reasons and 
Persons (Oxford, 1984), 206). If Neo-Lockean theories succeed in offering an account 
of personal identity then it is unclear why Mackie claims that an account of personal 
identity in terms of action appropriation requires that all past experiences and actions 
are appropriated rather than a sufficient number of past experiences and actions. Note 
that this comparison with Neo-Lockean views is merely meant to challenge Mackie’s 
assumption and is not intended to be an endorsement of Neo-Lockean interpretations of 
Locke. 
  
 
11 
than morally significant experiences and actions, since many 
thoughts and actions are morally neutral in the sense that one 
neither deserves reward nor punishment for having done or doing 
them. This observation invites a distinction between morally 
significant experiences and actions and those that are not morally 
significant. Since Locke—as Mackie acknowledges—is 
particularly interested in questions of moral accountability 
throughout his discussion of personal identity, it is plausible that 
he may have given morally significant experiences and actions 
different weight than other experiences and actions.
17
 On this 
basis, we can now contrast Mackie’s premise (3) with two 
alternative accounts of the persistence conditions for persons and 
distinguish the three following positions:  
 
(PI1) A person P1 existing at t1 is the same person as a person P2 existing at 
t2 if and only if P2 is able to be conscious of all of the morally significant 
experiences and actions that P1 was co-conscious. 
 
(PI2) A person P1 existing at t1 is the same person as a person P2 existing at 
t2 if and only if P2 is able to be conscious of all of the morally significant 
experiences and actions which P1 was co-conscious and of a sufficient 
number of other experiences and actions that P1 was co-conscious. 
 
(PI3) A person P1 existing at t1 is the same person as a person P2 existing at 
t2 if and only if P2 is able to be conscious of all of the experiences and 
actions that P1 was co-conscious. 
 
In support of (PI1) it can be argued that the restriction to 
morally significant thoughts and actions is in accordance with 
Locke’s aim to address questions of accountability. Locke 
introduces the notion of a person in addition to the notions of a 
human organism, or ‘man’ to use Locke’s term, and a substance 
in order to trace the continued existence of a subject of 
 
17
 Since for Locke appropriation is a necessary condition for moral accountability, 
morally significant actions will be actions that a self is able to appropriate. However, it 
is an open question whether there are appropriated thoughts or actions that are not 
morally significant. I want to be neutral on this issue and for this reason I do not 
formulate the following positions in terms of appropriation. 
  
 
12 
accountability over time.
18
 According to Locke, if we want to 
decide whether an individual now is the same person, or subject 
of accountability, as an individual that committed a crime, bodily 
continuity will neither be sufficient nor necessary. It is not 
sufficient, because an individual may have irretrievably forgotten 
a past crime and yet the body continues to exist (see II.xxvii.20). 
Locke’s prince-cobbler example is meant to show that bodily 
continuity is not necessary (see II.xxvii.15). Similarly, Locke 
argues that sameness of substance is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the continued existence of a person, or subject of 
accountability. Thus, Locke believes that it is important to 
introduce the term ‘person’ to properly address questions of 
accountability. Given that Locke’s account of personal identity is 
intended to track accountability, it seems pointless to include 
morally neutral experiences and actions into the persistence 
conditions for persons. 
However, one can defend (PI2) against (PI1) by arguing that 
including consciousness of some morally neutral experiences and 
actions will help a person to trace the morally significant actions 
within his or her past, because (PI1) may be too thin for a person 
to realize how an action was connected with other past 
experiences. Locke argues in II.xxvii.22 that in the Great Day 
one’s conscience will accuse or excuse oneself. This provides 
support for the view that an individual shall understand the justice 
of reward and punishment from a first personal perspective. 
Let us turn to (PI3)—the view that underlies Mackie’s 
argument. Due to forgetfulness (PI3) will be less often satisfied 
than (PI1) and (PI2). This calls into question the plausibility of 
(PI3), because it is problematic to accept that one ceases to be the 
same person as a past self by forgetting morally insignificant 
experiences or actions of the past self. For example, it follows 
that one ceases to be the same person merely by forgetting 
morally insignificant experiences such as the colour of the shirt 
that one’s mother was wearing a week ago. This result is 
 
18
 For further discussion why it is plausible to regard Lockean persons as subjects of 
accountability see Boeker, ‘The Moral Dimension of Locke’s Account of Persons and 
Personal Identity’. 
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particularly unmotivated if we take seriously Locke’s aim to 
address questions of accountability.  
Consequently, (PI1) and (PI2) are more plausible candidates 
than (PI3). On this basis we can conclude that Mackie’s premise 
(3), which assumes (PI3) and does not acknowledge the 
possibility of (PI1) or (PI2), is not well supported. Since Mackie 
emphasizes that moral accountability is at the heart of Locke’s 
theory, Mackie could welcome (PI1) and (PI2) as more 
sympathetic interpretations of Locke. There is no need to take a 
stance on whether (PI1) or (PI2) provides the better account of 
personal identity, as long as a person will be accountable for the 
same actions.
19
 
To sum up, Mackie argues that Locke’s theory is a theory of 
action appropriation, but he takes this to be an objection, because 
appropriation is not suitable to provide proper persistence 
conditions for persons. However, as I argued, Mackie’s argument 
can be criticized on several grounds: First, it assumes without 
further argument that appropriation is meant to provide 
persistence conditions for persons. Second, Mackie either equates 
appropriation with consciousness or memory in general and so 
does not leave room for appropriation to play a distinctive role in 
Locke’s theory, or appropriation will have to be understood in a 
sense that is inconsistent with Mackie’s argument. Furthermore, I 
argued that his assumptions concerning the persistence conditions 
for persons are very demanding and lack motivation in light of 
alternative accounts that are more sympathetic to Locke’s view. 
We can conclude that Mackie’s argument, due to its flaws, is 
not a reliable source to support an interpretation of Locke’s 
account of appropriation, and, in particular, it does not provide 
adequate support for the appropriation interpretation. Next, let us 
turn to Winkler’s interpretation to see whether his view is more 
promising. 
 
19
 One may argue that all experiences and actions are morally significant and that, 
consequently, (PI1) collapses into (PI3). I do not have an argument to rule out this 
possibility in principle. However, my main point still holds, namely, that Mackie owes 
us a further justification for why he endorses the very demanding condition (PI3). Note 
further that the options discussed here are not meant to be exhaustive. 
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§3. Winkler on Subjective Constitution and The Problem 
of Reconciling Appropriation and the Possibility of Divine 
Adjustments 
Winkler’s main contribution, as we will see in a moment, consists 
in his claim that appropriation plays an important role with 
respect to a person’s or self’s subjective constitution. We will 
have to examine whether, according to him, appropriation is 
merely involved in the constitution of a person at a time, or 
whether it additionally provides alternative persistence conditions 
for persons—as is assumed by the so-called appropriation 
interpretation in the more recent literature. He ends the paper by 
acknowledging that appropriation, or the subjective constitution 
of a person, is hard to reconcile with the possibility of objective 
divine adjustments. Yaffe and Weinberg argue that the 
appropriation interpretation is to be rejected due to this problem 
and, hence, it is worth examining it closely. Let us turn to the 
details of Winkler’s view. 
According to Winkler, a self’s or person’s own constitution 
provides the basis of Locke’s account of persons and personal 
identity: 
 
I am proposing that Locke is interested in a sense of the word self 
according to which what the self includes depends on what it appropriates. 
I think we can all imagine finding a place for such a notion. “Perhaps so-
and-so did commit the crime, but if he is not aware of having done it, then 
there is a sense in which the action is not his own.” (‘Locke on Personal 
Identity’, 205) 
 
As §26 makes clear, the self has a certain authority over its constitution. 
It is important to realize that this authority is not consciously exerted. I do 
not wilfully disown one act and appropriate another, instead I accept what 
my consciousness reveals to me. (‘Locke on Personal Identity’, 206) 
 
Winkler emphasizes the authoritative role that a self has over 
his or her own constitution. He also calls this the ‘subjective 
  
 
15 
constitution’ of a self.
20
 By this he means that any criticism must 
be based on the self’s own appropriations.
21
  
As before, we can ask whether appropriation plays a 
distinctive role or whether it reduces to consciousness. According 
to Winkler, consciousness is clearly a necessary condition for 
appropriation, but does he also regard it to be sufficient? He does 
not engage with this question, yet it can be argued that I am 
aware of more actions than those that I appropriate. For example, 
I can be aware of my sister’s actions by observing her, but I 
would not appropriate her actions as my own actions. Since 
Winkler argues that one must be aware of having committed a 
crime in order to appropriate it, I believe that he would be happy 
to acknowledge a difference between mere conscious awareness 
and action appropriation or, at least, he would be happy to regard 
appropriation as a special kind of conscious awareness.
22
 Hence 
consciousness is necessary for appropriation but appropriation 
cannot be equated with consciousness in general. This creates 
scope for appropriation to play a distinctive role in Locke’s 
theory. 
Winkler’s claims so far establish that appropriation plays an 
important role with respect to a person’s constitution at a time, 
but we have not yet encountered an argument for the further 
claim that appropriation provides alternative persistence 
conditions for persons. He does not explicitly distinguish these 
two questions and remains vague on the latter. Nevertheless, he 
maintains that ‘the constitution of the self takes place over time’ 
(207) and that the self over time cannot be constituted by 
consciousness alone due to the problem of transitivity that 
Berkeley and Reid raised for Locke’s theory.
23
 In response to this 
 
20
 Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity’, 201, 204, 208, 209, 220, 222, 223, 225.  
21
 See Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity’, 208. 
22
 See Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity’, 205. 
23
 See Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity’, 206–8. See George Berkeley, 
Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher, in The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of 
Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (9 vols., London, 1950), iii, 299; Thomas Reid, 
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. Derek R. Brookes (Edinburgh, 2002), 
III.vi, 276. 
  
 
16 
problem Winkler proposes that Locke could easily accept that 
personal identity over time is constituted by the ancestral of the 
co-consciousness or memory relation. For present purposes, I will 
not further engage with the question whether replacing the co-
consciousness or memory relation with the ancestral of that 
relation provides a satisfying solution to the problem of 
transitivity, because it leads astray from the actual topic of this 
paper.
24
 The more important question here is whether Winkler’s 
view that personal identity is constituted by the ancestral of the 
co-consciousness or memory relation leaves room for 
appropriation to provide alternative persistence conditions for 
persons. He does not give any indication that he intends his 
interpretation of Locke’s account of personal identity to provide 
an alternative account, but rather he presents it as a version of a 
psychological account of personal identity. Otherwise he would 
and should have made explicit that he intended to offer an 
alternative account. In the absence of such clarification, we have 
reason to conclude that, according to Winkler, appropriation is 
relevant for the constitution of a self at a time, but is not intended 
to replace psychological accounts of personal identity. 
Having argued that appropriation or subjective constitution 
plays an important role in Locke’s account of persons, Winkler 
ends his paper by raising a tension between the subjective 
constitution of a person and objective third-personal criticism and 
adjustments.
25
 It is important for Locke to leave room for the 
possibility of objective adjustments or criticisms, because he 
takes seriously the possibility of divine rectification at the Last 
Judgement (see II.xxvii.13, 15, 21–22, 26; IV.iii.6; IV.xvviii).
26
 
 
24
 For further discussion see Nicholas Jolley, Locke: His Philosophical Thought 
(Oxford, 1999), 120–21; E. J. Lowe, Locke on Human Understanding (Abingdon, 
1995), 112–14; Mackie, Problems from Locke, 178–83; Harold W. Noonan, Personal 
Identity, 2
nd
 edn. (Abingdon, 2003), 55–56; Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity, 53–
57, chs. 10–11; Matthew Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics (Oxford, 2013), ch. 8, especially 
353–59, 378–85.   
25
 See Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity’, 209–11, 220–23. 
26
 See also John Locke, Writings on Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (Oxford, 2002), 
especially ‘Resurrectio et quae sequuntur’, 232–37.  
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The doctrine of divine rectification says that God at the Great 
Day will reward and punish persons for their doings in this life, 
and, if necessary, correct human injustice.
27
 In order for God to 
justly reward or punish people at the Great Day an objective 
standard will be needed that guarantees, or enables God to make 
adequate adjustments such that, resurrected persons acknowledge 
all their past thoughts and actions and only their past thoughts 
and actions.
28
 However, is there room for such objective divine 
adjustments if the self is subjectively constituted? 
Winkler argues that it is difficult to reconcile appropriation 
with the possibility of divine adjustment. He connects the 
difficulty to a dilemma that Flew raised many years ago for 
Locke’s theory.
29
 Flew distinguishes phenomenal or seeming 
memory from genuine memory and argues that Locke’s theory 
collapses on either understanding of memory:
30
 On the one hand, 
 
27
 See Weinberg, ‘Author Meets Critics on Antonia LoLordo’s “Locke’s Moral 
Man”: Shelley Weinberg’; ‘The Metaphysical Fact’, 389. 
28
 See Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity’, 220. Winkler’s and Weinberg’s views 
concerning the possibility of divine rectification are similar. LoLordo agrees that the 
theory must provide scope for divine rectification, but denies the need for divine 
adjustments, because, according to her, there will be no misappropriations. See 
LoLordo, ‘Author Meets Critics on Antonia LoLordo’s “Locke’s Moral Man”: 
LoLordo’s Reply to Weinberg’; Locke’s Moral Man, 70–74. LoLordo’s arguments 
against misappropriations depend on a non-transitive interpretation of Locke’s account 
of personal identity. Although such interpretations have been defended by Mackie, 
Problems from Locke, 178–83, Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity, 53–57, chs. 10–
11, and Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics, ch. 8, especially 353–59, 378–85, the debate is not 
settled. I prefer to be neutral on whether Locke’s account of personal identity is 
transitive or not and hence I do not follow LoLordo in assuming that misappropriation 
is impossible; rather I believe that a theory that can incorporate misappropriations has 
broader scope.  
29
 See Anthony Flew, ‘Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity’, Philosophy 26 
(1951): 58. 
30
 I will follow Flew in presenting the dilemma in terms of memory. However, it is 
worth noting that Locke’s notion of consciousness is not to be reduced to memory, 
because it includes consciousness of the present and extends into the future (see 
Margaret Atherton, ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity’, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 8 (1983): 273–93; Matthews, ‘Descartes and Locke on the Concept of a 
Person’, 28–30; Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca, NY, 1996), 
105–12, especially 107; Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity, ch. 9; Udo Thiel, Lockes 
Theorie der personalen Identität, 129–31, and his The Early Modern Subject (Oxford, 
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if memory is understood in terms of phenomenal memory, then 
whatever I seem to remember was done by me. As a consequence 
Locke’s theory would not leave room for error. However, Locke 
mentions in II.xxvii.13 the possibility of ‘fatal Error’ and this 
conflicts with the phenomenal memory reading. On the other 
hand, if memory is understood in terms of genuine memory, Flew 
argues that Locke has to give up his view that personal identity 
consists in sameness of consciousness, admitting, according to 
Flew, that ‘same person’ has to be defined at least partially in 
terms of ‘same thinking substance’ (‘Locke and the Problem of 
Personal Identity’, 58). 
Winkler engages with the problem raised by Flew, and 
acknowledges: 
 
The problem is that if we respond by saying that any thought or action 
appropriated by my present self is in fact mine, we lose (as Flew in effect 
insists) the possibility of divine criticism (‘Locke on Personal Identity’, 
221) 
 
At the very least, Flew’s objection shows that the dominant themes in 
Chapter 27—the subjective constitution of the self, and the possibility of 
objective criticism and adjustment—cannot easily be combined (‘Locke on 
Personal Identity’, 222) 
 
It is right that if memory can be reduced to phenomenal 
memory, then the view will not leave room for divine criticism.  
However, the problem with Winkler’s analysis of the tension is 
that he follows Flew in understanding Locke’s account of 
memory in terms of phenomenal memory. Yet there is no good 
textual support for understanding Locke’s account of memory in 
this way. Memory, according to Locke, requires previous 
awareness of the thought or action remembered (see I.iv.20, 
II.x.2, 7):
31
  
 
 
2011), 109, 122–26). However, consciousness of past thoughts and actions involves 
memory (see I.iv.20, II.x). 
31
 See Don Garrett, ‘Locke on Personal Identity, Consciousness, and “Fatal 
Errors”’, Philosophical Topics 31 (2003): 100–2. 
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this laying up of our Ideas in the Repository of the Memory, signifies no 
more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in many cases, to revive 
Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed 
to them, that it has had them before. (II.x.2) 
 
The previous awareness condition of memory makes it 
possible to distinguish imaginary memories from genuine 
memories, at least from a divine perspective, because in the case 
of imaginary memories there has never been a previous 
perception of the thing or event that one now seems to remember.  
Although Winkler presents the problem as a tension between 
appropriation and the possibility of divine rectification, closer 
inspection shows that it concerns a tension between phenomenal 
memory and the possibility of divine rectification. Since Locke 
does not understand memory in terms of phenomenal memory, 
the problem can be avoided.  
Given the previous analysis, namely, that appropriation is 
relevant for the constitution of a person at a time but is not 
intended to provide alternative persistence conditions for persons, 
this result is not surprising. The objective standard that is needed 
for divine adjustments has to be built into the relation that 
constitutes personal identity over time. Since appropriation on 
Winkler’s view does not provide alternative persistence 
conditions, there is no specific problem concerning appropriation. 
If there is a tension, then it has broader scope and concerns 
psychological accounts of personal identity more generally.  
 
§4. Revisiting the So-Called Appropriation Interpretation 
In the more recent literature the so-called appropriation 
interpretation is often ascribed to Winkler. However, in light of 
the previous critical discussion of Mackie’s and Winkler’s 
interpretations, we have to revisit whether the appropriation 
interpretation is subject to the same problems and whether there 
is support for such a view. 
To begin, let me put aside Yaffe’s and Weinberg’s criticism of 
the appropriation interpretation. Both reject it due to the apparent 
problem that appropriation does not leave room for objective 
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criticism.
32
 However, as the discussion above has shown, this 
problem is merely apparent and arises because Winkler follows 
Flew in interpreting memory in terms of phenomenal memory. 
Since this reading is not supported by Locke’s text, Yaffe’s and 
Weinberg’s criticisms are undermined too.  
It remains to consider whether appropriation can provide 
alternative persistence conditions, as Yaffe, Weinberg, and 
LoLordo assume when they introduce the appropriation as an 
alternative to the memory interpretation. They do not offer a 
detailed argument, but rather they ascribe the view to Winkler, 
and sometimes more remotely to Mackie. However, as we have 
seen, neither Mackie nor Winkler offer arguments in support of 
the claim that appropriation is meant to provide alternative 
persistence conditions. Consequently, the view is unsupported in 
the absence of another argument. 
I will return to these issues in the final section. However, first 
it is important to re-examine Locke’s texts closely. This is the 
task to which I turn now. 
 
§5. The Role of Appropriation in Locke’s Texts 
In light of the problems that arise for Mackie’s and Winkler’s 
discussion of appropriation, and the subsequent lack of support 
for the so-called ‘appropriation interpretation’, it is fair to say that 
a satisfying understanding of the role that appropriation plays in 
Locke’s account of persons and personal identity is missing. This 
makes it worth returning to Locke’s texts and to re-examine his 
own understanding of appropriation. The problems identified in 
the previous considerations make it interesting to draw particular 
attention to the following questions: First, is appropriation 
relevant for the constitution of a person at a time? Second, is 
appropriation meant to provide a new self-standing account of the 
persistence conditions for persons? While Winkler puts emphasis 
on the former and is vague with regard to the latter, the problem 
with Mackie’s view is that he believes the latter.  
 
32
 See Weinberg, ‘Author Meets Critics on Antonia LoLordo’s “Locke’s Moral 
Man”: Shelley Weinberg’; ‘The Metaphysical Fact’, 389–90; ‘Locke on Personal 
Identity’, 401–2; Yaffe, ‘Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity’, 223. 
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Since Locke mentions appropriation in his chapter ‘Of Identity 
and Diversity’ explicitly only in II.xxvii.16 and 26, it will be 
helpful to consider whether his other writings help to provide a 
fuller understanding of his account of appropriation and its role in 
his discussion of persons and personal identity. Besides the 
Essay, the second of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government is an 
important source, because appropriation is relevant in the chapter 
‘Of Property’ (Two Treatises, II.v).
33
 I will therefore briefly turn 
to Locke’s Two Treatises to consider whether Locke’s 
understanding of appropriation there helps to illuminate his 
discussion in Essay II.xxvii.  
There are interesting terminological parallels between Locke’s 
discussion of persons and personal identity in Essay II.xxvii and 
his discussion of property in Two Treatises II.v, though we have, 
of course, to be cautious not to stretch the parallels too far, 
because the Essay is a philosophical work in which Locke aims 
for terminological precision, while in Two Treatises he follows 
ordinary language use and does not distinguish the terms ‘person’ 
and ‘man’.
34
 While in the Essay Locke speaks of the 
appropriation of actions by consciousness, in Two Treatises he 
discusses appropriation of external objects by labour. He argues 
in Two Treatises that by mixing one’s labour with common goods 
such as fruits, animals or land they become one’s property or one 
 
33
 References to Locke, Two Treatises are to John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1988). See Ayers, Locke, ii, 266–68; 
Thomas Mautner, ‘Locke’s Own’, The Locke Newsletter 22 (1991): 73–80; Thiel, 
Lockes Theorie der personalen Identität, 116–17, especially note 28; John W. Yolton, 
Locke: An Introduction (Oxford, 1985); Naomi Zack, ‘Locke’s Identity Meaning of 
Ownership’, The Locke Newsletter 23 (1992): 105–13, for discussion of the role of 
appropriation in II.xxvii in relation to Locke’s Second Treatise and natural law theory. 
Further literature on appropriation and ownership which focuses on the Second Treatise 
includes Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume 
(Oxford, 1991), 149–90; J. P. Day, ‘Self-Ownership’, The Locke Newsletter 20 (1989): 
77–85; Karl Olivecrona, ‘Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of 
Property’, Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1974): 211–30, ‘Locke’s Theory of 
Appropriation’, The Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974): 220–34; James Tully, A 
Discourse on Property: Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, 1980). 
34
 For further discussion see Ayers, Locke, ii, 266–68; Timothy Stanton, ‘Christian 
Foundations; or Some Loose Stones? Toleration and the Philosophy of Locke’s 
Politics’; Thiel, Lockes Theorie der Personalen Identität, 116–17, especially note 28.  
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makes them one’s own (see Two Treatises, II.v.26–39).  Hence, 
in this context ‘to appropriate something’ means ‘to make it one’s 
own’. The following passages further illustrate this point: 
 
God, who has given the World to Men in common, hath also given them 
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of Life, and convenience… 
yet being given for the use of Men, there must of necessity be a means to 
appropriate them [i.e. the fruits and beasts] some way or other before they 
can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man. The Fruit, or 
Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no Inclosure, and is 
still a Tenant in common, must be his, i.e. a part of him, that another can 
no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support 
of his Life.  
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet 
every Man has a Property in his own Person. The Labour of his Body, and 
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left in it, he hath 
mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common 
state Nature placed it in, it hath by his labour something annexed to it, that 
excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the 
unquestionable property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to 
what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left 
in common for others. (Two Treatises, II.v.26–27) 
 
How can we understand Locke’s claim that common goods 
become part of oneself by appropriation? Locke stands in the 
natural law tradition, and in natural law theory it was common to 
describe what belongs to a person with the term suum—one’s 
own.
35
 Grotius, for example, argues that “[b]y nature, a man’s life 
is his own, not indeed to destroy, but to safeguard; also his own 
are his body, limbs, reputation, honour, and the acts of his will.” 
(On the Law of War and Peace, 2.17.2.1).
36
 The suum can be 
 
35
 See Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property; Olivecrona, ‘Locke’s 
Theory of Appropriation’; Zack, ‘Locke’s Identity Meaning of Ownership’. 
36
 References to On the Law of War and Peace are to Hugo Grotius, On the Law of 
War and Peace, ed. Stephen C. Neff (Cambridge, 2012). Similarly as Grotius, Samuel 
Pufendorf lists ‘our Life, our Bodies, our Members, our Chastity, our Reputation, and 
our Liberty’ as ‘Things which we receive from the immediate Hand of Nature’ (Of the 
Law of Nature and Nations, ed. Jean Barbeyrac (London, 1729), 3.1.1). 
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regarded as the sphere of personality and it is often thought to 
extend to external objects. By making something one’s own one 
gains a special right to use the things one appropriated and one is 
entitled to expect reparation if others damage the things 
belonging to the suum.
37
 The term suum was translated by 
‘propriety’ and ‘property’ into seventeenth-century English.
38
 In 
Two Treatises II.v.27, Locke argues that property includes not 
only external objects, but also that everyone ‘has a Property in his 
own Person’ and that labour is the property of the labourer. Thus 
Locke’s notion of property has its origin in the notion of the 
suum.
39
 By investing labour we appropriate something, or make it 
our own. 
It is now time to turn to the relevant passages in Locke’s 
Essay. Within his discussion of persons and personal identity 
Locke mentions appropriation only in II.xxvii.16 and 26 
explicitly: 
 
For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this 
present self be made up of the same or other Substances, I being as much 
concern’d, and as justly accountable for any Action was done a thousand 
Years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am, 
for what I did the last moment. (II.xxvii.16) 
 
Person…is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; 
and so belongs to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and 
Misery. This personality extends it self beyond present Existence to what is 
past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and 
accountable, owns and imputes to it self past Actions, just upon the same 
ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present. All which is 
founded in a concern for Happiness the unavoidable concomitant of 
consciousness, that which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, desiring, that 
 
37
 See Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 4.4. 
38
 The terms ‘propriety’ and ‘property’ were often used interchangeably in the 
seventeenth century. Locke tended to use ‘propriety’ and changed it into ‘property’ in 
later versions of his work. See Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property, 172–
73. 
39
 For further discussion see Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property, 169–
73; Olivecrona, ‘Locke’s Theory of Appropriation’. 
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that self, that is conscious, should be happy. And therefore whatever past 
Actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present self by 
consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been 
done (II.xxvii.26). 
 
In these passages Locke speaks explicitly of the appropriation 
of past actions by consciousness, but his claim in II.xxvii.26 that 
a person ‘owns and imputes to it self past Actions, just upon the 
same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present’ 
suggests that appropriation extends also to present actions. 
By appropriating something one owns it.
40
 However, does ‘to 
appropriate something’ mean ‘to make something one’s own’ in 
the Essay as well as in Two Treatises?
41
 We find support for this 
reading in II.xxvii.24 where Locke states that I make thoughts 
and actions my own by my consciousness. Furthermore, the 
proposal that Locke continues to use appropriation in the sense of 
‘making one’s own’ fits squarely with Locke’s aim to offer an 
account of persons and personal identity that addresses questions 
of moral accountability. In order to hold a person accountable for 
an action, there has to be a way to decide whether the action is his 
or her own, because a person is not held accountable for the 
actions of others, at least if he or she is ignorant of them. This 
means just accountability presupposes a way of distinguishing the 
actions of one person from the actions of all other persons. If 
appropriation is understood as a means of making something 
 
40
 In addition to II.xxvii.26, this reading is suggested by II.xxvii.17: ‘That with 
which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join it self, makes the same 
Person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it self, and 
owns all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and 
no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.’ See also II.xxvii.14, 18, 24, 26. 
41
 This reading has been questioned by Mautner, ‘Locke’s Own’, who argues that 
there are two senses of own: One is the familiar possessive sense, and the other is an 
older usage, according to which ‘to own’ means ‘to state, declare, admit, confess, 
acknowledge it’ (74). According to Mautner, Locke’s notion of own in the Essay is to 
be understood in the declarative sense. For a critical response see Zack, ‘Locke’s 
Identity Meaning of Ownership’. I believe that it is difficult to understand Locke’s use 
of ‘own’ in II.xxvii in a purely declarative sense. For example, the expression ‘as its 
own’, which is part of the statement ‘and owns all the Actions of that thing, as its own, 
as far as that consciousness reaches’ (II.xxvii.17), can hardly be interpreted in the 
purely declarative sense, but rather introduces a reflexive, if not possessive, element.  
  
 
25 
one’s own, then appropriation distinguishes my actions from the 
actions of others and plays an interesting role in Locke’s theory. 
As already mentioned it is plausible to suppose that Locke’s 
account of appropriation in the Essay involves action 
appropriation both at a time when an action is initially performed 
and at a later time when we acknowledge a previously performed 
action as our own. I will call the former ‘appropriation of present 
actions’ and the latter ‘appropriation of past actions’. It is worth 
asking separately how the appropriation of present and past 
actions is to be understood.  
To begin with the appropriation of present actions, at the 
present moment I can be conscious of many actions. However, 
this awareness by itself does not make an action my own action, 
because I can also observe the actions of others.  The difference 
between my actions and the actions of others is that I perform my 
actions and that I am aware of performing them. Since I can also 
perceive other people performing actions, this difference cannot 
be exclusively explained with reference to the content of the 
perception, namely my representation of the performance of the 
action, but rather when I perceive an action as my own I have an 
intimate experience of doing the action, namely, an experience of 
the physical and/or cognitive labour that I invest. It is worth 
noting that purely physical movements of one’s body such as 
those of a sleepwalker will not be sufficient for action 
appropriation, because in such cases one lacks awareness of 
performing the action. Since all present actions that one 
appropriates involve awareness of one’s performance of the 
action, action appropriation will be accompanied by a distinctive 
inner experience of the physical and/or cognitive labour.  
To further support why I believe that the appropriation of 
present actions is accompanied by a distinctive inner experience 
of the labour that one invests, I want to draw attention to Locke’s 
remarks about sensitive knowledge: 
 
But yet here, I think, we are provided with an Evidence, that puts us 
past doubting: For I ask any one, Whether he be not invincibly conscious 
to himself of a different Perception, when he looks on the Sun by day, and 
thinks of it by night; when he actually tastes Wormwood, or smells a Rose, 
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or only thinks on that Savour, or Odour? We as plainly find the difference 
there is between an Idea revived in our Minds by our own Memory, and 
actually coming into our Minds by our Senses, as we do between any two 
distinct Ideas (IV.ii.14). 
 
For he that sees a Candle burning, and hath experimented the force of 
its Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt, that this is something 
existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain: 
which is assurance enough, when no Man requires greater certainty to 
govern his Actions by, than what is as certain as his Actions themselves 
(IV.xi.8). 
 
These passages support that, according to Locke, performing 
an action, such as eating pineapple, running a mile, or moving 
one’s arm, involves a distinctive experience which is not present 
when one merely thinks about an action, remembers an action, 
dreams about an action, or perceives the actions of others. This 
suggests that the initial performance of an action is accompanied 
by a distinctive inner experience, which provides a means for 
distinguishing my present actions from the actions of others, 
because when I am merely aware of actions of others I do not 
invest physical or cognitive labour and they lack the distinctive 
inner experience that accompanies my own actions.  
To sum up, neither the performance of an action nor the 
awareness of action performance is by itself sufficient for action 
appropriation.  In order for appropriation of present actions to 
take place, an individual needs to perform an action and be aware 
of performing the action and this awareness will be accompanied 
by an intimate experience that is distinctive of the physical and/or 
cognitive labour that one invests.
42
 This means that appropriation 
 
42
 Locke’s statement in II.xxvii.16 that I am accountable ‘for what I did the last 
moment’ supports the proposal the appropriation of present actions involves the 
performance of the action, because Locke does not merely claim that I am accountable 
for what I was conscious of the last moment. Similarly, he claims in II.xxvii.26 that a 
person that committed actions shall deserve punishment. The view defended here differs 
from Ayers’s claim that ‘[o]ur actions themselves…are ‘appropriated’ to us by an 
entirely natural and given principle of unity, namely consciousness, rather than by some 
acquisitive act of acknowledgement or ‘owning’ on our part.’ (Locke, ii, 268).  I believe 
that my interpretation can be defended against Ayers’s, because he does not carefully 
distinguish between the appropriation of present and past actions and generalizes the 
claim that past actions are appropriated by consciousness. 
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of present actions is not explained exclusively in terms of 
consciousness, because it additionally involves the performance 
of the action. Moreover, the conscious awareness that 
accompanies the performance of the action is intrinsically 
different from other conscious experiences that are not 
appropriated. 
Let us turn to the appropriation of past actions. According to 
Locke, we appropriate past actions by consciousness (see 
II.xxvii.16, 26). The question to consider is whether and how 
appropriation of past actions by consciousness is sufficient to 
distinguish my past actions from the past actions of others. To 
answer this question we have to look deeper into Locke’s account 
of consciousness and memory. According to Locke, to be 
conscious of a past action is to remember the past action. As 
stated above, for Locke memory of a past action requires previous 
awareness of the action (see I.iv.20, II.x.2, 7).
43
 This means that 
when I remember a past action I remember having done or having 
perceived a past action rather than merely remembering that a 
past action took place.
44
 Given Locke’s understanding of memory 
and the proposed account of the appropriation of present actions, 
I want to suggest that a past action is appropriated on the basis of 
remembering the previous performance of the action, which 
includes remembering the distinctive inner experience that 
accompanied the performance of the action. If this is correct, then 
it is possible to distinguish my past actions from the past actions 
of others: My past actions are the actions that I appropriated 
previously by performing them and experiencing the performance 
of them. It follows that the appropriation of past actions is to be 
understood in terms of the initial appropriation and memory. This 
means that the appropriation of past actions is not another type of 
action appropriation, but rather it can be explained in terms of 
remembrance of the initial act of appropriation, which took place 
at the time when the action was performed.  
 
43
 See also Garrett, ‘Locke on Personal Identity, Consciousness, and “Fatal Errors”’. 
44
 Locke’s account of memory can be classified as episodic memory. For further 
details concerning different varieties of memory see Rebecca Copenhaver, ‘Thomas 
Reid’s Theory of Memory’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (2006): 175–79. 
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As a consequence of this proposal one has to accept that 
subjects do not have a choice whether or not to appropriate a past 
action, but rather, if their memory presents a past action as 
performed by them, they have to acknowledge the action as their 
action.
45
 As soon as one’s memory revives the initial act of 
appropriation and makes one aware again or the physical and/or 
cognitive labour that one invested, one acknowledges that one did 
the action and thereby appropriates it. However, it is a further 
question whether by appropriating a past action one 
acknowledges that one deserves reward or punishment for this 
action.  
For instance, let us assume someone stole figs regularly from a 
fig tree in the neighbourhood. If we assume further that the 
person confessed the deed a few years later and properly repaid 
his or her neighbours for the damage, then this is a case where the 
person still acknowledges that he or she stole the figs and 
appropriates the action as his or her own, but does not any longer 
regard him- or herself as blameworthy. Locke might have 
anticipated such examples in II.xxvii.26 where he not only speaks 
of the appropriation of actions, but also of the appropriation of 
merit for them. This means that although when my memory 
presents a past action as done by me I cannot deny that I did the 
action, I may, nevertheless, have a choice as to whether I accept 
merit for the action. Unfortunately, Locke says very little 
concerning the appropriation of merit for actions and whether or 
not the appropriation of actions has to be considered separately 
from the appropriation of merit for actions will ultimately depend 
on the particular understanding of merit or reward and 
punishment. 
So far I proposed an interpretation of the appropriation of 
present and past actions. Although Locke speaks explicitly only 
of the appropriation of actions (see II.xxvii.16, 26), it is worth 
considering whether and how this interpretation extends to the 
 
45
 Winkler makes a similar remark: ‘I do not wilfully disown one act and 
appropriate another; instead I accept what my consciousness reveals to me’ (‘Locke on 
Personal Identity’, 206). 
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appropriation of thoughts.
46
 Any reader who is convinced that 
Locke’s account of appropriation is restricted to action 
appropriation can skip this part, because it is an additional 
component which supplements the account that I have given of 
action appropriation, but the account of action appropriation does 
not require it. According to my proposed interpretation, 
appropriation is a prerequisite for accountability and since some 
of our thoughts are morally significant it is plausible that one will 
not only be accountable and rewarded or punished for actions, but 
also for certain thoughts. In these cases it will be important to 
have a means of distinguishing my thoughts from the thoughts of 
others.  
Let me begin with an example. The demonstration of a 
significant proposition can be a thought that deserves reward. 
Demonstrating a proposition will involve several individual steps 
and in each step of the proof one will invest cognitive labour and 
be aware of the cognitive labour one invests. Thus it can be said 
that by investing cognitive labour I make the demonstration my 
own. This suggests that the appropriation of a present 
demonstration can be understood by means of the cognitive effort 
one invests and one’s awareness of that effort. In analogy to the 
appropriation of actions, it is plausible that a demonstration will 
be appropriated at a later time by remembering the previous act of 
appropriation.
47
 
To turn to another example, let us consider the invention of 
new things. According to Locke, ideas of modes are created in the 
mind. In contrast to ideas of substances, which are meant to 
represent real things in the world and capture the way the world is 
 
46
 Locke claims in various passages that a person is conscious of thoughts and 
actions (see II.xxvii.9–10, 14–15, 19, 21, 24). Here and in the following I follow Locke 
and use ‘thought’ in a broad sense, interchangeably with Locke’s equally broad term 
‘perception’.  
47
 In IV.i.9 Locke observes that our memory of demonstrations often does not retain 
all the individual steps of a demonstration, but rather the memory merely retains a 
conviction of the proof. On this basis, in order to appropriate a past demonstration it 
may be sufficient that one is still aware that one demonstrated a proposition by one’s 
own cognitive efforts even if one does not recall all the individual steps of the 
demonstration. 
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independent of us, it is up to the creative mind to combine any 
ideas into the idea of a complex mode (see II.xxx, III.v, III.vi.46). 
Ideas of substances can be said to have a world-mind direction of 
fit, while ideas of modes have the opposite direction of fit. ‘We 
do not pick out something in the world and then design a mode 
idea to correspond to it. Rather, we design a mode idea to serve 
certain purposes and then use it to refer to anything out in the 
world that happens to answer to it’.
48
 Some ideas of modes exist 
in the mind, before any object corresponding to them exists in 
reality. Printing is an example of such a mode, because the idea 
of printing had to be formed in the mind of the inventor before 
any printing machines were built (see II.xxii.9). People who 
invent new things invest cognitive labour when they combine 
several simple ideas into a new complex idea and as part of this 
process they consider mental images of the things they aim to 
invent. Inventions of new things are further examples that make it 
plausible to say that certain thoughts are appropriated by 
investing cognitive labour.  
The examples of thoughts considered so far both involve 
activity of the person who has them. In such cases it is plausible 
that appropriation of present thoughts takes place by investing 
cognitive labour. However, not all thoughts are active. Many are 
passive. For example, I perceive many things passively. This 
raises the question whether and how passive thoughts are 
candidates for appropriation. Passive thoughts provide 
information and access to information, or the lack thereof, can be 
morally significant. For example, if I perceive that a child is in 
danger, then I will receive morally significant information. The 
content that the child is in danger is not sufficient to make the 
perception my own, because it can in principle be shared by other 
people. The appropriation of passive perceptions such as this can 
be explained in one of the following two ways: First, it can be 
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 Antonia LoLordo, ‘Three Problems in Locke’s Ontology of Substance and 
Mode’, in Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Nature and Norms 
in Thought, ed. Martin Lenz and Anik Waldow (Dordrecht, 2013), 53. For a detailed 
discussion of Locke’s distinction between modes and substances see also LoLordo, 
Locke’s Moral Man, 74–82.  
  
 
31 
suggested that the passive perception provides input that I then 
actively process, for instance, by actively reflecting on the 
situation and identifying ways to help. My active processing 
involves cognitive labour and as in the examples above 
appropriation can be said to consist in the cognitive labour that 
one invests.  
Alternatively, one could draw attention to the inherent 
reflexivity of every perception. Locke argues in II.xxvii.9 that 
internal to the perception there is the perception that one has the 
perception.
49
 This internal reflexive element is a distinctive inner 
experience that makes the perception my perception. The 
suggestion is that perceptions are appropriated by having them, 
which builds on Locke’s claim that perceiving involves 
perceiving that one perceives (see II.xxvii.9). If I remember at a 
later time the previous perception, I will not merely remember 
that the child was in danger, but rather I will also remember my 
perceiving that the child was in danger. Thus, I will appropriate a 
past perception by remembering the previous appropriation of the 
perception. 
This second model of appropriation is not restricted to passive 
thoughts. It can be extended to all thoughts. The view would be 
that all present thoughts are appropriated by having them and all 
past thoughts are appropriated by remembering the previous act 
of appropriation. While I believe that Locke’s text leaves room 
for this interpretation, I want to offer a reason in favour of the 
first proposal. 
The first model offers an account of appropriation of thoughts 
that is analogous to Locke’s account of appropriation in Two 
Treatises. The view has the advantage that it can, in analogy to 
the account in Two Treatises, provide a basis for gaining 
particular rights with regard to appropriated thoughts, for 
instance, intellectual property rights. The cognitive labour that 
one invested can be seen as the basis for special rights with 
regard to the thoughts and thereby serve as a basis for reward or 
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 For further discussion see Thiel, The Early Modern Subject, 114–16; Shelley 
Weinberg, ‘The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke’s Essay’, History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 25 (2008): 26. 
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punishment. If we adopted the second proposal, appropriation 
would not be a prerequisite for accountability and reward and 
punishment in any meaningful way. On the contrary, if active 
cognitive labour that a person invested is taken into consideration 
and if appropriation of thoughts is explained in terms of the 
cognitive labour that one invests, then we have a means to single 
out thoughts that are likely to have greater significance than 
others and be worthy of reward and punishment. Thereby the first 
model is suitable to offer an account of appropriation that is a 
prerequisite for accountability and reward and punishment, while 
the second is not. 
My proposed interpretation of Locke’s account of 
appropriation in the Essay is analogous to Locke’s account of 
appropriation in Two Treatises. I believe that this is a strong 
feature of the interpretation and makes room for appropriation to 
play a distinctive role in Locke’s theory, because in the Essay 
appropriation distinguishes my thoughts and actions from the 
thoughts and actions of others and this is a prerequisite for moral 
accountability.  
 
§6. Appropriation and Persistence Conditions for Persons 
If we accept the interpretation of appropriation that I have given, 
then it follows that appropriation is relevant for the constitution 
of a person at a time. That means at a time when a person initially 
appropriates a thought or action that thought or action becomes a 
constitutive part of the person he or she is. Since the 
appropriation of past thoughts or actions is to be explained in 
terms of the initial appropriation and memory, no new additional 
act of appropriation takes place at that later time or during the 
intermittent period. Of course, Locke accepts that we appropriate 
past thoughts and actions, but the important point is that 
appropriation of past thoughts or actions can be traced back to the 
initial act of appropriation at the time when the action was 
performed or the thought was initially had and for this reason it is 
best understood as the revival of a previous appropriation, rather 
than a new appropriation. This is an important result, because it 
undermines the view that Locke’s account of the persistence 
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conditions is to be understood solely in terms of appropriation. 
The relations that explain why the earlier person is identical with 
the later person will be consciousness or memory relations, rather 
than self-standing relations of appropriation.  
Since this point is crucial for distancing my interpretation from 
the so-called appropriation interpretation, let us look at the issues 
more closely. We can advance the debate by acknowledging the 
following distinctions: Persistence conditions are commonly 
expressed in terms of relations and we can distinguish the relation 
proper from the relata that stand in said relation. Psychological 
accounts of personal identity, including the memory 
interpretation, maintain that the relevant relations are 
psychological such as memory relations and that the relata are 
any thoughts, experiences, or actions one is or can be aware of. In 
principle, if appropriation provides the persistence conditions for 
persons, it can constitute or be part of the relation and/or the 
relata.  
The discussion above has shown that the proposal that 
appropriation is supposed to provide alternative self-standing 
relations over time lacks support. Locke emphasizes that personal 
identity consists in sameness of consciousness. This itself is a 
strong reason to accept that the relevant relations are 
consciousness relations rather than relations of appropriation.
50
 
Although Mackie presents Locke’s theory as a theory of action 
appropriation he falls back to explaining the view in terms of 
psychological relations. Similarly Winkler argues that personal 
identity consists in co-consciousness or memory relations.  
However, the second option is more promising, that is the view 
that appropriation helps to identify the relevant relata. While 
traditional psychological accounts of personal identity include 
any thoughts, experiences, or actions one is, or can be, aware of 
as potential relata, it can be argued that those thoughts, 
experiences, and actions that one acknowledges as one’s own, or 
appropriates, should be given special weight. For instance, the 
relevant relata could be restricted to appropriated thoughts and 
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 There is wide interpretive scope to spell out what exactly Locke means by 
sameness of consciousness.  
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actions. On this view, the relevant relata are a subset of those that 
traditional psychological interpretations take into consideration. 
Alternatively, appropriated thoughts and actions could be given 
more weight so that one’s identity as a person does not cease 
when one continues to be aware of formerly appropriated 
thoughts and actions, but has irretrievably forgotten other 
thoughts and actions that one observed and never appropriated. 
This view differs from traditional psychological accounts, 
because it introduces a qualitative component in addition to the 
quantitative counting of the number of existing of psychological 
connections. 
The advantage of these proposals is that they focus on 
candidates for morally significant thoughts and actions
51
 and take 
seriously Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term (see 
II.xxvii.26), because, according to Locke, it is important that one 
acknowledges an action as one’s own in order to be held 
accountable for it (see II.xxvii.22, 26).
52
 In this sense it can be 
said that appropriation is integrated into the persistence 
conditions for persons, but it is important to realize that it is built 
into the relata rather than the relations. 
LoLordo is one of the few interpreters who endorses an 
appropriation interpretation, and it is worth commenting on how 
my proposal differs from her view. I believe that a main 
advantage of my proposal is that it achieves a new level of 
specificity that is lacking in LoLordo’s interpretation. According 
to her, ‘to extend your consciousness backward to an action is 
simply to appropriate it as your own or to impute it to yourself’.
53
 
This formulation is vague and can in principle be reconciled with 
either reading. However, had LoLordo intended to argue for the 
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 I use the expression ‘candidates for morally significant thoughts and actions’, 
because all morally significant thoughts and actions will be among the appropriated 
thoughts and actions, but not all appropriated thoughts and actions need to be morally 
significant.  
52
 Yaffe acknowledges that the appropriation interpretation can better accommodate 
Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term than the memory interpretation. See 
Yaffe, ‘Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity’, 222–23. 
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 LoLordo, Locke’s Moral Man, 70. 
  
 
35 
view that the proper place for appropriation is in the relata, then 
her initial characterization of the view should be refined to make 
this explicit.  
One further point of difference is worth noting. LoLordo 
systematically rules out that there is misappropriation. If we 
adopt my distinctions, I prefer to rephrase the issue as the 
question of whether misrepresentations of one’s past thoughts or 
actions are possible. On my interpretation this depends on the 
relations that connect the originally appropriated action with 
one’s current revival of the original action appropriation. Since 
my account of appropriation is consistent with different views 
regarding the relations that constitute the persistence conditions—
for example, the relevant relations could be memory relations, 
psychological relations, causal relations, or a metaphysical fact of 
consciousness—the possibility of misrepresentation should not be 
systematically excluded, but rather it will depend on one’s 
account of the relevant relations. The important point for present 
purposes is that the question whether Locke’s theory leaves room 
for misrepresentation is independent from Locke’s account of 
appropriation. Consequently, there is no reason to dismiss the 
importance of appropriation in Locke’s theory due to the 
possibility of misrepresentation.
54
  
The discussion so far has shown that the so-called 
appropriation interpretation lacks support, or, at least, it is vague. 
In contrast to this, the view that appropriation is to be located 
within the relata is more precise and has the further advantage 
that it does not regard appropriation as a rival to the different 
interpretations of Locke’s persistence conditions for persons such 
as memory interpretations, psychological interpretations, or 
Weinberg’s metaphysical fact account of consciousness.
55
 While, 
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 It follows that the dispute between LoLordo and Weinberg concerning the 
possibility of misappropriation does not directly concern appropriation. See LoLordo, 
Locke’s Moral Man, 72–74. Weinberg responds to these passages in ‘Author Meets 
Critics on Antonia LoLordo’s “Locke’s Moral Man”: Shelley Weinberg’. See also 
LoLordo’s response in ‘Author Meets Critics on Antonia LoLordo’s “Locke’s Moral 
Man”: LoLordo’s Reply to Weinberg’. 
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 Weinberg argues in her work that Locke’s account of personal identity involves 
an objective metaphysical fact of consciousness. According to her, God needs to be able 
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for example, memory interpretations (or psychological 
interpretations more generally) and Weinberg’s metaphysical fact 
interpretation are commonly presented as exclusive 
interpretations, appropriation, understood as proposed above, can 
be reconciled with either view. Regarding the former view, it can 
be said that memory relations connect appropriated thoughts 
actions at different times. Regarding the latter, a metaphysical 
fact of consciousness can be said to connect appropriated 
thoughts and actions. This is a promising result, because my 
interpretation provides a distinctive place for appropriation in 
Locke’s theory and offers an explanation of why others who 
rejected or neglected appropriation were mistaken to do so.
56
 
 
University College Dublin 
 
 
to look at an objective fact when he rectifies failures of human justice at the Great Day. 
She maintains that the advantage of her interpretation is that it takes Locke’s religious 
commitments seriously and that it is not subject to the problems that arise for memory 
interpretations. See Weinberg, “Locke on Personal Identity,” “The Metaphysical Fact.” 
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